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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will provide a background look at China’s recent history from World War II to 
present day to examine how they are gaining influence in the South Pacific and Southeast 
Asia.  China is determined to become a global power and increase its international 
standing in term of influence and Southeast Asia is the start point. This thesis will also 
examine different approaches the United States and China use to gain Influence and 
resources.  In particular, this thesis will use math modeling and game theory to explore 
linkages between assistance and Southeast Asian influence.  
This thesis examines how Chinese assistance is countering the U.S. efforts in 
Southeast Asia and why the United States must win the battle.  This thesis will look at the 
current U.S. policies toward China and Southeast Asia and explore possible options for 
the United States in the future.  Also how China may try to take control of the South 
China Sea. This thesis will make recommendations how the United States could more 
effectively utilize its resources to keep China in check. The thesis will conclude with 
recommendation for future policy based on the research to determine if the United States 
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I. INFLUENCE: THE NEW WEAPON IN THE BATTLE FOR 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
“China is too near and the United States is too far.1” 
A. BACKGROUND 
In an effort to maintain or enhance influence world-wide, the United States gives 
hundreds of millions of dollars to countries that most Americans know very little about. 
There are a number of questions that can be asked about this ongoing disbursement of 
money overseas; however, the main focus of this analysis is whether aid disbursed is 
effective in off-setting China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia. Influence has 
primarily been carried out through diplomacy and can also include development 
assistance among other tools. Development assistance is an important mechanism used to 
help developing or under-developed countries succeed in areas such as education, health, 
democracy and governance, economic growth and to respond to humanitarian crisis.  
Development and military assistance are viable options the U.S. government (USG) uses 
as part of its foreign policy. The complexities of China’s growing influence are 
multifaceted, and, the United States cannot ignore that it could lose ground in key regions 
throughout the world.  
Over the years, the United States has refined its usage of influence to buy friends, 
forge relationships, intimidate enemies and ward off competition. Recently, the United 
States has been the only power outside of Southeast Asia to exert influence in the region.  
However, in the last 60 years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gained on the 
United States, and in recent years, the PRC has ramped up its efforts to the extent that it 
is now a serious rival to U.S. interests.   
With the emergence of terrorist groups, bombings in Bali, Philippines, Thailand 
and Jakarta, and al-Qaeda affiliated links in Southeast Asia; the United States has more to 
                                                 
1 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The United States and Southeast Asia toward a 




deal with than China. Also, with the United States using much of their influence and 
wealth to justify the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has left Southeast Asia exposed. 
Southeast Asia is in the difficult position of choosing between the United States and 
China, “China is too near and the United States is too far.”  Fortunately, despite the 
PRC’s rapid ascent, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the PRC will surpass the 
United States the question is will countries of Southeast Asia look towards the United 
States or look to China for leadership. Only time will tell. 
B. THESIS PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis looks at the influence/assistance competition between the United 
States and China through the lens of game theory. Through math modeling, game theory 
effectively underscores the range of consequences in which the United States could be 
confronted with, if it does not properly use development and military assistance in 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. It is therefore, important to be familiar with and to 
understand what is at stake under a variety of circumstances. More specifically, this 
thesis will: Discuss post-China 1949 events that helped the PRC position itself; present 
examples of Chinese and U.S. characteristics and tactics they use to gain influence with 
assistance; PRC’s diplomatic efforts and implications for the United States; identify 
pivotal development assistance programs within the region; highlight how simple game 
theory illuminates the growing Chinese threat; recommendation; how the United States 




II. CHINA POSITIONING FOR POWER 
A. POST CHINA 1949 EVENTS THAT HELPED THE PRC 
To appreciate the PRC’s raising influence, economic growth, and gains in 
political and military power;2 one must understand the relationship between Chinese 
history and its current foreign policy objectives. In 1949, after two decades of civil war, 
the communists emerged victorious over the nationalists.  The war-torn PRC was in utter 
disarray:  internal infrastructures were virtually nonexistent, the treasury was bankrupt 
and roads and travel systems were in shambles.  While the country was in physical 
disrepair, Mao and the communist leaders emerged stronger and more-clear headed about 
the PRC’s future. In his speech to the people, Mao proclaimed “Ours will no longer be a 
nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.”3   Mao believed that 
Communist ideology, vast reserves of human capital and devout nationalistic sentiments 
ensured that the PRC was well positioned.  Mao’s vision, there were four key themes that 
fast tracked the PRC’s transition:  They were the establishment of the PRC in 1949, a 
rapidly-industrializing country, European withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and the need 
for the PRC to gain domination in the region to become an influence on the world stage.  
The first point was the importance of the 1949 victory over the Nationalists, 
which energized and united a beleaguered PRC. Mao’s speech encapsulated the day’s 
sentiments and provided a road map for things to come. At the time, Mao’s words filled 
the country’s aching need for hope, a bright future and national pride.  Regardless of 
whether or not the people were ready for the PRC to become a world leader and play an 
important role in the international arena the country embarked on that path. This action 
served notice to Chinese citizens and to the world that the PRC envisioned itself as a 
leader on the world stage. This desire was manifested through the PRC’s support of a 
                                                 
2 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The United State and Southeast Asia toward a Strategy 
for Enhanced Engagement, A Conference Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, December 2008, 
12. 




number of revolutionary independence movements in Asia.4   At this time, China’s main 
interactions in Southeast Asia were to support Communist insurgencies in Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.5  Through these 
engagements, the PRC learned how to leverage support through “divide and conquer” 
politics. Such tactics became an effective template, and by the 1990s, the PRC’s leaders 
added diplomatic components and a military game plan to their strategy.  
The second point was the PRC’s growing need for resources. Over the last three 
decades, the PRC’s economy experienced huge growth.6  To fuel a red-hot economy that 
grew around 10 percent annually,7 the PRC needed more and more natural resources, of 
which it had limited supplies. Many experts agree that if the PRC’s economic growth 
continues at its current pace, within a few decades the PRC will need more natural 
resources than exist on the planet.8  To compensate for its limited supply of resources, the 
PRC became more aggressive in its pursuit of relationships with countries that had what 
it needed. One example is Burma, where the PRC provided the Burmese government 
with hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure and military assistance in order to 
gain access a strategic port and natural resources.9  This exchange is common place in a 
region that has many economically poor and undeveloped countries that also possess 
natural resources.  
Third, was the vacuum that was created when European imperialism and Soviet 
communist forces departed from the region in the 1990s. These withdrawals signified a 
major turning point for Southeast Asian countries.  The 50-year decline began when 
                                                 
4 Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade, and Influence, 2003, 
164. 
5 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010. 220. 
6 China’s Growth in Monetary Policy. 
7  Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade, and Influence, 
2003, 209. 
8 David Gewirtz,”Is China gearing up to start World War III?”  ZDNet Government, September 7, 
2010, http://www.zdnet.com/blog/government/is-china-gearing-up-to-start-world-war-
iii/9368?p=9368&pg=2&tag=mantle_skin;content. 
9 Note that no one has been able to identify specific dollar amounts. 
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Indonesia declared independence in 1945. Thereafter, the Philippines gained its 
independence in 1946 and Burma secured its independence from England in 1948. 
During the Cold War, Southeast Asia became a battle Ground for “Decolonization” and 
threats from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was at this time that 
Malaysia and Singapore were granted their independence from England and France was 
driven out of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In 1984, Brunei was granted their 
independence, thus marking the end of European dominance in Southeast Asia. Between 
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Europeans substantially cut investments and 
downgraded economic agreements. New-found sovereignty and the United States as the 
only outside influence, gave Southeast Asian countries the opportunity to begin anew. 
With the Europeans and the Russians out of the picture, the United States remained the 
only country in the region able to counter the PRC.10  The PRC’s growth in agriculture, 
industry, science, technology, military, economics, further enhanced its status in 
Southeast Asia. This new paradigm outlined new parameters: the PRC and the United 
States would now be in direct competition for greater influence; and in addition European 
donors were marginalized due to a smaller presence and decreased financial engagements 
in the region.  Beijing was fully aware of such changes and made no secret of its 
intensions to lessen U.S. influence in Southeast Asia.  With this goal in mind, the PRC 
directly challenged U.S. interests. Dr. Frost stated,11 “The risk is not that China will push 
the United States out of Asia, now or in the future. The main risk is that over time, the 
U.S. voice in the region will be gradually drained of influence relative to China’s. This 
challenge stems from the contrast between China’s galloping economic performance and 
America’s current domestic and international headaches….Although the United States is 
indeed a “resident power”….It must never take its presence in Asia for granted.”12  
                                                 
10 Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade, and Influence, 
2003, 209. 
11 CRS Report for Congress, China’s “soft Power” in Southeast Asia, January 4, 2008. 1. 
12 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010. 141. 
6 
 
The final point was the reality that the PRC could not gain greater control in the 
world arena if it did not control the region. As previously noted, the PRC began on this 
trajectory in 1949 and today Beijing still maneuvers to bring Southeast Asia into its 
sphere of influence. In short, the PRC would have to become the regionally dominant 
power as outside influence and imperialism in the region diminish.  As PRC 
encroachment in the region progresses, Beijing’s ability to maneuver more freely and 
achieve broader political, economic and security goals has increased. This also ensures 
that Southeast Asian nations do not act in way that runs counter to PRC interests.13 
 
                                                 
13 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010. 120. 
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III. CHINA’S ASSISTANCE 
A. CHINA’S ASSISTANCE 
The United States is not the only country buying influence in Southeast Asia; now 
China is also a player in the battle for this key region of the world. China’s rapidly 
growing economy enables it to aggressively pursue its interests throughout the world.  
China’s approach to influence is twofold: to spend money on military equities and to 
provide assistance to underserved countries in exchange for influence. On both fronts, 
China is keeping pace, if not surpassing the United States, in the international diplomatic 
game.  
Over-- the past decade and a half, while few in the West were paying 
attention, Beijing built a coalition of countries, a great many of them in 
Southeast Asia and Africa that can be trusted to vote for China’s interests. 
It’s a bloc reminiscent of the one the Soviet Union assembled during the 
Cold War, though focused on economic and trade advantages, not security 
issues. China’s strategy is working, and nowhere more so than with 
Beijing’s campaign to delegitimize Taiwan as an independent state. In 
2008, for instance, Malawi announced it had cut diplomatic relations with 
the island would-be nation; Taipei couldn’t match China’s offer of $6 
billion in aid. Senegal broke relations with Taipei in 2005.14 
Due to the world’s financial crisis that has limited the amount foreign direct 
investment into Asia, and the decline in the attractiveness of other Southeast Asia 
countries, Asia has become an economy battle ground. This is a new challenge that the 
United States, China and Southeast Asia is facing.  To address this question, this section 
will discuss: Characteristics of Chinese Assistance, tactics China is using, how China is 
using the South China Sea and Mekong River to gain influence.  
 
                                                 
14 Stefan Halper, “Beijing's Coalition of the Willing” Foreign Policy. July/August 2010. 




B. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE ASSISTANCE 
The PRC’s growing use of “soft power” in Southeast Asia in nonmilitary 
inducements includes culture, diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, and investments. And while 
these gifts ingratiate regional countries to the PRC, they also counter U.S. foreign policy 
objectives.15  Anecdotal evidence suggests that China is spending billions of dollars in 
assistance to influence and to create legacy programs. Verifiable gifts can be found 
throughout the region.  They include large-scale infrastructure projects, newly-
constructed roads and beautiful buildings with “gift from China” plaques in countries that 
clearly cannot finance such structures. Other, less visible types of assistance include 
equally tantalizing incentives, i.e., preferred trade status, military hardware, humanitarian 
assistance and interest-free loans.  
The magnitude and range of incentives the PRC provides is seemingly limitless. 
More notably however, is that these gifts come with no strings attached. In other words, if 
the PRC gives money to a country, that country will not need to do anything in return. 
Chinese aid is to give without requiring any accompanying political or human rights 
standards. 16 This approach to aid is often more attractive than the U.S. assistance, which 
hinges on improvements in domestic policies.17  When doling out assistance, the PRC 
also takes into consideration individual Southeast Asian countries’ relationships with the 
United States In the past, it sought to cultivate relationships with countries that had poor 
relations with the United States18 Today, the PRC still utilizes the same approach, but is 
now targeting U.S. allies in an attempt to undermine these relationships.  
Another notable characteristic is the PRC’s preference to conduct unilateral, 
rather than multilateral diplomatic discussions. This type of power play enables the PRC 
                                                 
15 CRS Report for Congress, China’s “Soft Power” in Southeast Asia, January 4, 2008. 1. 
16 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010. 121. 
17 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The United State and Southeast Asia toward a 
Strategy for Enhanced Engagement, A Conference Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, December 
2008. 8. 
18 Colloquium Brief, Contending Perspective: Southeast Asia and American Views on the Rising 
China, U.S. Army War College, Singapore, 22–24 August 2005.   
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to divide and conquer. By undermining international foramens, Southeast Asian countries 
are slowly losing their collective bargaining powers.  Additionally, because the PRC is 
such a “big fish” compared to all of the other countries, they are able to either meet the 
needs of any one country or isolate a country for a carrot and stick approach if needed. 
Most countries feel that their interests will be better met if they go it alone, rather than 
through ASEAN.  
Goals of Chinese aid can best be characterized as a driving need to acquire 
resources, win friends and expand influence.  Whether a gift of assistance benefits the 
population is not important. More often than not, PRC funds are used to build 
unnecessary projects that serve political rather than practical imperatives. Such projects 
support local politicians and the PRC’s foreign policy objectives, but not the interests and 
needs of the indigenous population.19  Because China does not release official figures for 
aid, it is unclear how much aid is given, where it is given and for what purposes. Without 
transparency, one wonders what the PRC is hiding. Until more is known about PRC 
assistance, one can only make assumptions about motivations based on known 
transactions. 
1. Velvet Glove Tactics 
Increasingly, influence tactics the PRC employs have become heavy handed.  
Initially, these efforts to leverage greater support were largely benign, i.e., the PRC’s role 
in the Asian financial crisis. In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift and some 
tactics have been downright aggressive and intimidating. If the PRC is unable to get what 
it wants through assistance, the tactics quickly turn dirty. It is important to note these 
trends as they are instructive for U.S. foreign policy experts.  Some of the most notable, 
and most telling, examples include the PRC’s: increased control over the Chinese Sea, 
build-up of maritime forces, and increased interest in the Mekong River. 
                                                 
19 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 28.  
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When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997, the PRC wanted to be seen as a 
financial savior.  The PRC stabilized the region and provided assistance to countries in 
need through financial support and a rescue plan called the “New Security Concept.” This 
plan ensured that Beijing would put its weight behind any regional economic and 
diplomatic interaction going forward.20  Through this parlay, the PRC was able to 
substantially increase its involvement in Southeast Asian trade, investment and financing 
policies, while providing confidence to investors in other financially weak countries. In 
addition, the New Security Concept restructured trade agreements to benefit the PRC. In 
the end, Southeast Asia was able to successfully get through the financial crisis however 
it was not without a high cost. Every country in Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), except the Philippines, emerged with a serious trade imbalance with the 
PRC.21   
 
                                                 
20 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 120. 
21 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 125 Table 2.  
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IV. CONTROL OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND MEKONG 
RIVER 
A. SOUTH CHINA SEA 
The South China Sea has vast amounts of oil and gas untapped reserves.  With an 
estimated 28–213 billion barrels of oil and almost 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, it 
is among the largest in the world.  The South China Sea is also a geographically and 
strategically important trade route for the region.22  In order to gain the upper hand—and 
controlling interest—Beijing proactively staked out claims to the Paracels and Spratly 
Island Chains.   Blustery language and vigorous military exercises has intimidated and 
effectively scared off other claimants. In 2009, an international incident involving 
harassment of the USNS Impeccable by five Chinese vessels resulted in unusually 
pointed remarks from Secretary Clinton.23  In addition to her recrimination about the 
harassment, she spoke about the disputed territory and asserted that the problem must be 
resolved through multilateral discussions with all claimants. The PRC viewed this as “an 
attack on China.”24  
As late as July 2010, the PRC claimed much of the South China Sea based on 
hundreds of years of history and Beijing labeled the South China Sea part of its “core 
interest” of sovereignty, similar to Taiwan and Tibet.25  Notwithstanding these 
declarations, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei lay claim to the same territories. 
Given the lead and the competitive advantage the PRC has over other countries, it will be 
difficult for any country to successfully counter the PRC.  While the PRC has no legal  
 
                                                 
22 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 128. 
23 Blue Star Chronicles, http://bluestarchronicles.com/2009/03/09/usns-impeccable-chinese-vessels-
harass-us-navy-ship/, accessed October 2011. 
24 China’s Foreign Ministry.Jang Jiechi, The Wall Street Journal,  01October 2010, 
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_wsj.  
25 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 132. 
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standing for claiming these waterways, it planted flags on the seafloor to show 
ownership. These actions help the PRC prepare to take control of the South China Sea 
with or without force.  
The question of PRC control of the Paracel and Spratly Island Chains whether it 
will happen, but rather, how the United States and other Southeast Asian countries will 
react. It is very unlikely that the United States would take military action over the Paracel 
and Spratly Island Chains. But, if China uses military force on an individual country to 
take control of these Islands, the United States may be forced to take action. 
B. PRC DICTATING TERMS IN CHINA SEA  
In addition, pressure is directed to foreign companies to comply with the PRC’s 
wishes, i.e., halting operations unless agreements are negotiated through the PRC and 
imposing fishing bans in waters in which the PRC has no jurisdiction.  In 2007, BP and 
Exxon both halted work within Vietnam after the PRC merely hinted that the work off 
the coast of Vietnam violated the PRC’s sovereignty. The PRC told Exxon that they 
would be excluded from the Chinese market should they fulfill other countries contracts 
for exploration in the South China Sea. BP subsequently abandoned planned exploration 
because of these ownership claims between the PRC and Vietnam.26    
In 1999, the PRC unilaterally imposed a fishing ban on waterways claimed by 
Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. To enforce the ban, the PRC increased patrols 
and has even detained other countries’ fishermen who were working in the disputed 
waters.27  By default, the PRC now controls all of these waterways even though they 
legally do not have the right to do so.  
In the last few years, China has increased military exercises in the South China 
Sea. Provocative naval maneuvers enable the PRC to flex its military might while 
warding off potential rivals.  General Chen Bingde, Chief of the PLA General Staff 
                                                 
26 Jason Folkmanis, U.S., Vietnam seek to limit China, Keep Power Balance, Bloomberg, 28 August 
2009. 
27 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 134. 
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Department stated “China must pay close attention to changes in the situation in region 
and we must prepare ourselves for a military struggle.”28  The PRC’s exercises are part of 
a rapidly growing Navy. Maritime security is fast becoming a cornerstone of the PRC’s 
expanding military capabilities. “Surface vessels, submarines, long range aircraft, 
ballistic anti-ship missiles, and future aircraft carries, back the PRC’s threats. With the 
PRC’s emergence as Asia’s principal naval power, territorial disputes from other 
claimants have been down-graded.”29   In addition, Southeast Asian counties are at a huge 
disadvantage, because even all the ASAEN members’ navies combined could not rival a 
robust PRC navy.30  With an enhanced navy, the PRC has the ability and, what it believes 
is, the justification, to rightly claim the sea and its resource for itself. 
The Mekong River may be one the most important tools the PRC has to influence 
Southeast Asia. Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam rely on the Mekong 
River, but because the PRC built 15 dams on the river, the PRC controls it. By regulating 
the water supply to all of the downstream countries, it also has jurisdiction over energy 
production, fishing habits, and rice production for millions of people. The impact is 
staggering: with control of just one river, the PRC regulates 40 percent of Vietnam’s rice 
outcome, which Vietnam exports to the world.31  By cutting off water, China could 
cripple Vietnam economically and have an adverse affect on global food.  
For the PRC to succeed, it must also engage in high-level diplomacy efforts. The 
PRC is utilizing a classic velvet glove approach: strong arm tactics coupled with soft 
power. As previously mentioned, assistance is an importance part of the soft power 
equation. In addition, diplomacy and bilateral talks are also critical.  Diplomatically, the 
PRC has carefully crafted an approach for dealing with ASEAN and Southeast Asian 
countries.  Most notably, the PRC negotiates economic linkages with specific member 
                                                 
28 Clive Schofield and Ian Storey of the Jamestown Foundation, Publication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0, 
November 20, 2009. 
29 Clive Schofield and Ian Storey of the Jamestown Foundation Publication: November 20, 2009. 
30 2009 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2009. 
31 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 137. 
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countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASAEN), in order to leverage 
greater regional financial control and to bolster bilateral trade and investment 
agreements.32  As the foremost international coalition in the region, ASEAN acts as an 
important counterbalance to the powerful PRC.  
China is now able to cultivating bilateral relationships and undermining ASEAN. 
With ASAEN no longer a single voice, rather multiple countries looking out for their 
own interests, the PRC has found a way to leverage influence within the organization.33  
By cultivating bilateral relationships, rather than working through ASEAN, the PRC is 
able to chip away at the larger organization one country at a time. This has been 
accomplished by the PRC strengthening its position in Southeast Asia and increasing 
gifts of military equipment and economic incentives to individual countries.34  
Despite objections from ASEAN, Beijing continues to aggressively solidify 
bilateral relations.  The PRC began by supplying large quantities of heavy weapons and 
other military equipment to the Burmese regime in exchange for illicit drugs, timber, 
pearls, and precious stones. PRC engineers also built new roads and bridges to facilitate 
this trade.  As the “primary economic patron” of the small but strategically important 
nations of Burma, Cambodia and Laos, the PRC provides considerable economic aid to 
these countries as well as Indonesia and the Philippines.  
To permanently divide ASEAN, the PRC created the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
(GMS) with Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam35. With billions of dollars 
flowing into GMS countries, the PRC set up a new economic corridor, provided needed 
new physical infrastructure connections, promoted closer economic interactions and 
                                                 
32 Colloquium Brief, Contending Perspective: Southeast Asia and American Views on the Rising 
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strengthened political and military ties.36  Funds have gone into these countries at a rate 
greater than what ASEAN countries have provided.37  The PRC’s two-pronged approach 
of separating individual countries from ASEAN and taking controlling interests of 
countries’ policies have  effectively divided mainland Southeast Asia from maritime 
ASEAN countries. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF PRC ASSISTANCE   
With deep pockets and well-planned foreign policies, the PRC’s regional 
authority will undoubtedly expand, and as it does, the United States will have to respond. 
The United States will have to consider implications of each action no matter how 
inconsequential, since each seemingly small issue has the potential to have lasting 
repercussions. Front-burner issues, in which the United States will have to contend, 
include: 
1. Monitoring Rivalry in the South China Sea 
Turf battles over rights to significant oil and natural gas reserves, the Paracels and 
Spratly Island Chains, and fishing rights, are just a few of the extremely complicated and 
contested issues. Overshadowing these complex regional tensions in the South China Sea 
is an emerging maritime rivalry between the Unites States and China.38  To ward off rival 
interests, the PRC has warned other countries, including the United States, to abandon 
their goals of gaining territory in this particular area. 
2. Encouraging the PRC to Engage in Multilateral Forums 
The PRC blasted Secretary Clinton’s reprisal of China’s lack of interest in 
conducting multilateral discussions. One PRC official said that Secretary Clinton’s 
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remarks were a provocation to the PRC and that they were aimed at sowing dissent 
between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The quote went on to say that what 
Washington was really seeking to do was to counter the PRC’s growing influence by 
gaining support of countries in the region.”39  While such remarks are not commonplace 
in diplomatic circles, the Secretary highlighted what everyone knows to be true: the PRC 
avoids multilateral discussions so that it can operate on its own terms. 
3. Monitoring the PRC’s Bilateral Relationships 
Part and parcel of PRC avoidance of multilateral talks is increased emphasis on 
bilateral relationships. As the PRC forges these relationships, it is able to gain greater 
regional influence while also driving wedges between the United States and the host 
nation’s goals. The PRC builds its case by reminding Southeast Asian countries of how 
the PRC helped them out during the Asian Financial Crisis, and that the United States can 
be nothing better than distracted partner because of its own domestic situation. According 
to the PRC, it is likely that Southeast Asia will receive little if any United States attention 
in coming years.40  Weakening bilateral military to military links between ASEAN 
members and the United States is another tactic the PRC is utilizing.  In a draft 
Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, specific provisions 
prohibited joint military exercises involving United States and any member of the 
ASEAN military.41  Fortunately, this declaration has yet to be ratified.   
                                                 
39 2010 report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred 
Eleventh Congress Second Session, November 2010, 137. 
40 Center For Strategic and international Studies, The United State and Southeast Asia toward a 
Strategy for Enhanced Engagement, A Conference Report of the CSIS Southeast Asia Initiative, December  
2008, 1. 
41 Colloquium Brief, Contending Perspective: Southeast Asia and American Views on the Rising 
China, U.S. Army War College, Singapore, 22–24 August 2005.   
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4. Tempering PRC Assistance 
In Burma, the PRC provided $200 million in loans after the United States 
imposed sanctions against Burma for human rights violations.42  House of 
Representatives Dana Rohrabacher warned that Burma is a “Chinese power grab” and 
that its natural resources are literally being stolen by China.43  When the United States 
imposed sanctions on Burma’s government and withheld aid, Burmese leaders looked to 
the PRC for aid that had no strings attached. In addition, the PRC added a military 
component and supplementary economic support in order to gain power and influence 
over Burma.  
Cambodia is another example where the PRC undermined U.S. objectives and 
world sentiment. In 2009, the U.N. opposed the return of Uighurs living in Cambodia to 
the PRC. Cambodia disregarded the U.N. and returned the Uighurs to the PRC and was 
given $1.2 billion in aid and loans from China.44  The PRC sweetened the deal by filling 
an order of 257 military trucks to Cambodia that the United States had cancelled due to 
the deportation of the Uighurs.45   
5. Encouraging Transparency in Assistance 
Assistance is one of the most important tools a country can use to expand its 
influence. In the United States, government-sponsored donor agencies are required by 
law to report to Congress on development assistance funding. This is not the case for the 
PRC as there are no reliable data sources that track   Chinese aid. To make the issue more 
convoluted, many forms of PRC foreign aid, such as loans, the building of large public 
facilities and infrastructure projects, and trade and investment agreements, are not 
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counted as official development assistance funds and a single Chinese agency to keep 
record of aid does not exist. This lack of oversight however is not a mistake, rather an 
effective way of keeping expenditures secret. Funding for such assistance follows the 
PRC leadership’s diplomatic schedule and is not provided in annual increments. Beijing 
is also reluctant to reveal aid totals because it fears a domestic backlash given the level of 
poverty in the PRC its own large population.46   An added benefit is that other donors 
have no idea how to negotiate to counter the PRC, since what the PRC is spending is 
unknown. This is a huge benefit as it enables China to know at what threshold it can 
trump other countries. 
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V. UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE 
A. U.S. ASSISTANCE 
What do Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) 
and Kiribati have in common? These small island countries play an important role not 
only in protecting the USG’s interests in the Southeast Asia and South Pacific, but also 
throughout the world.  All of these countries receive varying levels of assistance, which is 
primarily economic, but also includes noneconomic support such as military protection, 
training in maritime and border security measures, postal service and the benefit of U.S. 
citizenship in the case of Micronesia, the RMI and Palau.47  In return, the USG gets 
access to runways, ports and surveillance information and has greater representation 
within the United Nations (U.N.).  All of this support begs the question why does the 
USG care about the South Pacific to the extent that it is willing to spend billions of 
dollars and use diplomatic capital on these small Pacific Islands?  The answer is simple: 
to protect USG interests, to compete against China’s growing influence in the region and 
the world, and to promote security on the mainland.  
The United States has Compact of Free Association agreements with Palau, the 
RMI and Micronesia.48  These agreements provide substantial assistance to these 
countries through the Departments of Interior and State, and provide U.S. citizenship to 
people living on these islands. The Compact of Free Association between the United 
States and Palau was entered into 15 years ago, and provides Palau with money to 
improve their schools, infrastructure, health systems and economy. 49 It also provides 
postal services to Palauans, which means they have a U.S. zip code and are able to send 
and receive mail as one would on the mainland. From 1995–2009, the USG gave this 
                                                 
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Compact of Free Association: U.S. Assistance to Palau.” 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-858T (accessed August 30, 2010). 
48 United States Government Accountability Office, “The U.S. Compact of Free Association, Palau’s 
Use of and Accountability for U.S. Assistance and Prospects for Economic Self-Sufficiency” 
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49 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Compact of Free Association: U.S. Assistance to Palau.” 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-858T (accessed August 30, 2010). 
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small island nation with a population of only 20,000 people $852 million in humanitarian 
assistance.50  Per capita, this is more that the United States gives Israel on an annual 
basis.51  In return, the United States has access to ports and is allowed to conduct 
surveillance, both of which enabled the United States to monitor activities of Japan and 
China.  In addition, the United States has had better influence in the U.N. since Palau is a 
voting member.   
South Pacific islands staunchly support the United States, and in the U.N. Palau 
voted with the United States 94.2% of the time, Micronesia, 96.2%; Nauru, 96%; and 
RMI, 89%.52  In March 2003, the United States put together an international coalition 
called the “Coalition of the Willing” to legitimize the U.S. effort in Iraq.  Micronesia, 
Nauru, Palau, the RMI, and Kiribati were all members of this coalition.53  Most recently, 
these countries again showed their support for the United States on another politically 
sensitive issue: the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba.  
On October 28, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly condemned it 
for the eighteenth consecutive year. 187 countries voted in opposition to 
the embargo, three countries voted in favor (the United States, Israel and 
Palau) and two abstained (Micronesia and RMI).54 
B. U.S. ASSISTANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
1. United States Assistance in Southeast Asia 
To fully appreciate the role in which assistance plays in Southeast Asia, one must 
understand how assistance is contented in overarching foreign policy objectives. The 
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United States maintains close relationships with countries throughout Southeast Asia in 
order to meet U.S. interests,  serve as a counter balance to China, and provide assistance 
to countries in need.  More specifically, U.S. regional interests:  
 Promote stability and balance power: with the objective of keeping Asia 
from being dominated by any entity; 
 Prevent exclusion from the region by another power or group of powers; 
 Ensure maritime security and safeguard navigation; 
 Promote trade and investment; 
 Support treaty allies and friends; 
 Promote democracy, rule of law, human rights, and religious freedom; and  
 Prevent the region from becoming an al-Qaeda safe haven for terrorists.  
To advance these interests, the U.S. government agencies with appropriate 
authorities must expand policies.  In all instances, multiple agencies are involved, but 
because one agency usually has expertise in a given area, that agency takes the lead.  The 
Department of State takes the lead in diplomacy to build relationships, protect 
agreements and communicate government to government messages. For maritime 
security and training, the Department of Defense (DoD) is the lead agency.  The 
Department of Defense carries out maneuvers for its own purposes, but it also backs up 
DOS diplomatic points, by reminding countries of U.S. military superiority.  
Humanitarian and development assistance is critically important as Southeast Asia has 
the dubious distinction of being the region most inflicted by natural disasters.  In 
addition, the region has multiple development issues such as HIV/AIDS and other life-
threatening illnesses, low levels of education, drug trafficking, food insecurity, security 
concerns and corruption. In cases of humanitarian and development assistance, USAID 
takes the lead. 
Characteristics of delivery of U.S. assistance are transparent and predictable.  In 
other words, it is known, to the American public and the rest of the world, how much is 
given to each country and for what purposes.  Agencies delivering assistance are required 
to conduct lengthy assessments that justify any expenditure.  These reports are shared and 
often co-written with other U.S. government agencies and requests for monies are 
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checked to ensure they are consistent with foreign policy objectives for the country and 
the region.  Once these documents are finalized, they are presented to Congress and the 
White House for approval.  While assistance is distributed to meet U.S. foreign policy 
objectives, it is done so with strings attached, i.e., improving education standards, 
reducing child mortality, increasing opportunities for vulnerable youth who may become 
combatants.  A main premise of the United States where assistance is concerned is that 
countries with stable, healthy, educated populations are better neighbors and trading 
partners are less likely to be a security risk or become a haven for insurgents.   
According to the FY 2010 Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ), Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam are the United States’ three highest priorities and therefore 
will receive approximately 40% of the region’s allotments. Indonesia tops the priority list 
as it is the most populated Muslim country and the world’s third largest democracy. The 
Philippines, a close partner and ally of the United States, will be given aid to support 
peace and democratization and assistance will also be given to the region to help with the 
denuclearization of North Korea. Vietnam will receive assistance to facilitate economic 
growth and government reform. By technical area, the main areas in which the United 
States funds: Peace and Security, Economic Growth and Investing in People, are 
approximately divided into thirds.  Peace and Security programs to counter terrorism and 
stabilizes insecure areas.  Economic Growth activities focus on income generation 
programs, climate change, microfinance and clean energy.  Investing in People support 
promotes maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS prevention programs and basic education.  
Specific illustrative examples of United States funded assistance programs 
throughout the region include: 
2. Cambodia: Investing in People 
In Cambodia, the mortality rate for young children is one of the highest in 
Southeast Asia.  To decrease the mortality rate among children, mothers and infants, 
USAID supports reform efforts to strengthen local and national governments, provides 
trainings for healthcare works, improves clinics, undertakes immunization programs and 
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provides healthcare for local communities.  These efforts have made substantial 
differences in the health of Cambodia’s children and its entire population.  Another 
substantial part of the IIP portfolio is the lifesaving antiretrol therapy for people infected 
with HIV and the TB control program. 
3. Philippines: Peace and Security 
The Philippines is one of the region’s oldest democracies, but also struggles with 
development challenges and terrorism.  In addition to other assistance programs, the 
United States funds a robust peace and security program the conflict-affected areas of 
Mindanao.  These programs work with vulnerable youth through training programs and 
giving them alternatives to joining insurgency groups.  Other elements of the program 
offers dispute resolution programs to local leaders and agencies. Good governance 
activities dovetail with peace and security programs to ensure greater sustainability. A 
Regional Development Mission (RDM) could befit the Philippines. The United States 
could provide Humanitarian Assistance for regional issues and support it without a large 
U.S. presence.  Due to the mission’s greater preview, it is able to work more closely with 
international partners and strengthen regional systems.  The RDM is able serves as a 
regional hub to provide and address a broader scope of issues. Both the Philippines and 
the United States would be able to work together on transnational, bi-lateral crisis when 
they arise. RDM is able to prove humanitarian assistance, specific programs include; 
addressing climate change through regional entities and policies; mitigating the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases; enhancing trade and economic growth and working to 
end human rights abuses and ethnic tensions postconflict. 
The U.S. National Security Strategy Statement calls on China to “act as a 
responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and 
others to advance the international system....55” It goes on to state that if China pursues a 
“transformative path of peaceful development” the United States will “welcome the 
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emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to 
address common challenges and mutual interests.56” To promote its interests relative to 
China in Southeast Asia, the United States has generally followed a strategy that 
maintains a “balance of power in the region through our alliances and military presence” 
while also engaging China to “encourage simultaneously its responsible integration into 
international affairs . Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
James Kelly, in testimony before the House International Relations Committee in June 
2004, stated that “this is a time of transition” in the region and emphasized that “at the 
top of our list of policy priorities is waging the war against terror” before he identified the 
Philippines and Thailand (as well as Japan, South Korea and Australia) as traditional 
allies and strategic partners in and beyond the region.” Singapore was also identified as 
an effective partner for building regional security.  
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VI. CHALLENGES/RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. CHALLENGES 
1. Effectiveness of External Influence on Southeast Asia 
Every year, the United States government (USG) gives billions of dollars to help 
Southeast Asian countries to combat insurgencies. This external influence is the life 
blood for some states. External influence can sustain fragile democracies, legitimize 
governments and help underserved populations with their most basic needs. However, if 
misused, external influence can cause unnecessary loss of life, undermine political capital 
and waste money that could have been more wisely spent at home. Given the expense and 
international visibility of assistance, it is critical that United States get it right from the 
beginning. Getting it right entails having a strategic framework outlining foreign policy 
objectives and having agreement on terms between the donor and host states prior to a 
commitment of resources. A well thought out plan takes into consideration the types of 
assistance to be committed, since this aspect is often more important than the amount of 
money that is given. 
B. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE 
External influence is support given to one state from another in order to advance 
the donor state’s agenda. While this idea sounds rudimentary, negotiating terms of 
support, deciding upon appropriate types of assistance, determining circumstances under 
which aid is provided and identifying intended outcomes are extremely complicated and 
nuanced processes. In diplomacy, United States and China tries to influence foreign 
governments by providing military equipment, training, development assistance and 
sharing information in exchange for increased input on host governments’ policies.  
Benefits host governments reap include investment in their country’s underfunded 
sectors, such as health and education, access to military hardware and technical 
assistance. More importantly however, is the host government’s ability to take credit for 
these investments with its own population. For this mutually beneficial relationship to 
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work, both sides must deem the relationship important and see the other as playing a vital 
role in achieving success.  Too many times the United States takes too much credit for 
the programs it provides.   From making sure all USAID programs are branded with the 
USAID logo, to military aid given only when the United States sees fit. This creates the 
perception that the host nation is a puppet of the United States.  Because much of the 
Southeast Asia public already believes that the United States is or has manipulated 
politics in the region its credibility is called into question. This presumption made it 
difficult for them to support the U.S.’s National Security Strategy. As a result Southeast 
Asian counties and the United States find it hard to be able to synchronize efforts to fight 
insurgencies. 
C. CURRENT EXAMPLES OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE IN AN 
ASSISTANCE CONTEXT 
Assistance to states enables the USG to exert external influence and advance 
foreign policy objectives throughout Southeast Asia. For the most part, the USG has been 
successful; however there have been situations where USG involvement has backfired.  
The USG’s current Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is ideal example where the USG 
has successfully influenced policies, deterred insurgents and promoted development 
goals.  
Within the last ten years, wielding influence has become increasingly difficult due 
to the types of conflicts in which the USG is involved and the complexity of these 
engagements in each country. One side does not fit all. The situation in the Philippines is 
the not the same as in Indonesia.   One policy area where new and pragmatic thinking is 
occurring is the USG’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.  The COIN strategy is often 
referred to as a work in progress because it must be regularly reassessed and revised due 
to a continuously-changing insurgency. However, because notable successes this policy 
has yielded, it remains an ideal current example to refer when discussing external 
influence and its effectiveness.   
Traditional COIN strategies are used as vehicles to address two areas that fuel 
insurgencies: political instability and security operations. In order to successfully defeat  
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insurgencies in these key areas, a standard COIN model must be carried out.  DoD, DoS, 
USAID and all USG must work together for the COIN model to work.  This model 
integrates three main pillars:57   
• Security.  Applying external influence to promote security primarily occurs 
through military assistance.  Military assistance includes technical assistance, hardware 
and software, training of trainers, advising and assisting. These types of interventions 
enable host states to build their internal security structures through trainings that enhance 
the effectiveness of their own military and police forces and improve the equipment they 
have to combat insurgencies. Providing assistance to enhance local police forces is a key 
aspect for host states, and is often times the most important aspect of COIN strategy.58  
Helping states improve security is beneficial to both sides:  it paves the way for donor 
states to begin work in other development areas and shrink al-Qaeda safe havens for 
terrorists, and it enables the host government to “showcase” to the local population that it 
is capable of addressing serious issues.   
• Political. The political pillar focuses on strengthening the capacity of the host 
government.59  It is critical that a host government’s population believe that the state is in 
control and that it is able to deliver services. A well-known anecdote that demonstrates 
the effectiveness of a government is whether the government can fill potholes.  In other 
words, can states’ governments address the most basic needs of the people?  Does the 
population have free and fair elections?  Do they have clean water?  Does the population 
have access to education and healthcare? If the population believes that the state cannot 
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for China or the insurgency to exploit. If a state is unable to provide a basic need, it will 
look outside to a quick fix. With China’s no string approach, it is likely it could be the 
first one the State turns to. 
• Economic. The economic pillar includes humanitarian assistance (HA), i.e., basic 
health care, livelihoods assistance, education, and infrastructure.60  HA is distributed 
under the direst circumstances: when a natural disaster or a serious conflict occurs.  In 
either situation, a significant portion of the population is affected. It is at that juncture 
that the international donor community steps in to give aid and prevent a greater 
humanitarian crisis. During such crisis, money and supplies are needed urgently despite 
the fact that it is often difficult to determine how to best distribute assistance. To prevent 
abuse, donor countries must have a substantive understanding of the host government’s 
capacity to absorb support, and to wisely manage donations.61 
COIN strategies work when security, political and economic pillars work together 
and are derived from local intelligence.  Ideally, the military, working in concert with the 
local police and military, would provide security; The local government would make 
decisions in order to serve the needs of the local population; and the state would provide 
financial support to bring these three elements together.  
COIN’s strengths are: a) flexibility, which enables decision makers to tailor 
interventions according to the needs of a current situation be it peace keeping operations, 
stabilization, or reconstruction; b) providing a strategic framework that is easily 
understood enables decision makers or agencies to determine where their equities would 
be the most value added to an effort; and c) utilizing a holistic approach that is 
population, not enemy centric. 
                                                 
60 United States Department of State, (2007, October)“Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy 
Makers,” 18. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
Exerting external influence is a credible and often effective way to advance USG 
foreign policy objectives.  However, as noted in this paper earlier, these efforts are not 
full proof. The types of engagements in which the USG is currently involved require 
flexible strategies that can be tailored according to specific circumstances.  This would be 
an easier task if only one USG agency was involved however, under a Southeast Asia 
strategy multiple agencies are involved, which makes the task exponentially more 
complicated.  The following recommendations build on established theories and offer 
pragmatic solutions for improving how the USG can exert external influence in Southeast 
Asia.     
E. WALKING THE WALK 
Coordination efforts among government agencies primarily involve attending 
meetings and exchanging information. While it is useful for agencies to be aware of each 
other’s’ activities, such meetings can be superficial and encourage agencies to continue to 
utilize a stove pipe approach.  To get to the heart of true interagency coordination, 
agencies need to go beyond rhetoric and address tough issues, such as sharing money for 
programs where there is commonality.  In Iraq, the military worked closely with the 
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) on a job creation program.62  With a small amount 
of money, approximately $50,000; this program simultaneously improved security and 
generated income for disenfranchised youth. Congress repeatedly sites this particular 
program as a development model.  Clearly more of this type of programming needs to be 
done. For interagency collaboration to occur, agencies must do more than “talk the talk,” 
they must also walk the walk where coordination is concerned. 
F. UNILATERAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
Locations where strategies are carried out often have weak and corrupt local 
governments.  This presents major obstacles for donor states.  Donor states are forced to 
                                                 
62 Congressional Research Service (2009, May) “Office of transition initiatives after 15 years: Issues 
for Congress“ http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40600.pdf (accessed September 24, 2010). 
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work with leaders that lack credibility, where assistance funds will be misused and under 
circumstances where they will host states not get the credit they deserve for providing 
assistance. It is therefore important for the USG, to have mechanisms available to provide 
foreign assistance directly to local populations and still work with the central 
government.  Under the new foreign assistance strategy in Philippines, direct aid is given 
to Philippines to ensure that local populations benefit.  While it would not be possible or 
wise to do this under all circumstances, it would be an effective tool in broadening and 
deepening support among local populations. 
G. PROTECTION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
Foreign assistance organizations conduct assessments in specific technical areas 
to determine which development programs best serve host states’ beneficiaries. These 
assessments are conducted in coordination with other donors, the host government and 
local populations.  Once development projects are identified, the donor and host 
government sign a bilateral agreement outlining terms.  While painstaking efforts are 
taken to assess, identify and implement projects, the same amount of attention is not 
given to protection of aid projects. Closer coordination between aid agencies and the 
military could help close this gap.  
External influence through assistance is an important diplomatic tool, however 
given the types of engagements in which the USG is currently involved, it is a blunt tool. 
A couple of examples of challenges are as follows:  
 USG aid agencies are the best funded agencies, but do not have the ability 
to withhold assistance if host governments do not act in the best interest of 
the USG.   
 USG foreign policy objectives are often counterproductive.  In the case of 
Pakistan, the USG provides $1.5 billion dollars a year in development 
assistance.  This overwhelmingly generous sum does not yield any 
goodwill with the local population, due to vehement opposition to USG 
supported drones.  Moreover, the Pakistani government accepts the use of 





H. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
It should be prose that United States sharpen diplomatic assistance tools, so that 
they can more effectively be used for external influence and that Congress change laws 
pertaining to types and usage of funds, so that they are more user friendly in an 
interagency context. Interagency cooperation has been touted as a panacea to solve 
communications among agencies.  Policymakers have held countless conferences; written 
numerous white papers, lessons learn assessments and interagency memos; and tried to 
improve upon internal government communications for decades. Outcomes have met 
with mixed results, and the bottom line is that while agencies leaders give resounding 
approval to improve relations with their brethren; it simply is not happening.  Agencies 
do not commit their senior level employees whom have long careers ahead of them to 
work on interagency relations. Since this situation exists across agencies, it means that 
agencies can “talk the talk” about cooperation without every really integrating program in 
the field.  For fundamental shifts to take place in terms of how the government conducts 
business, topics discussed in high-level meeting must be carried out with countries the 
United States is trying to influence in mind.  In order for this to occur, the conversation 
about interagency cooperation needs to be “reframed.”  
In most academic articles and books on interagency collaboration, the same 
approach is recommended: to coordinate at the highest levels.  What this looks like in 
reality is that agencies hold trainings, conferences, war game together and at most have 
offices in other agencies’ buildings. Outcomes from these activities are negligible even 
though it appears that something significant is taking place. The problem with this 
approach does not resolve how agencies can better communicate with one another. It 
looks good on paper, but it only partially addresses the problem.  A substantial shift in 
this paradigm ironically would come from a nuanced change. That is to say that throwing 
more resources to make this work is not the answer, rather being more strategic and 
considering where the best points of engagement would work among agencies. 
Goodwill can only go so far. The instance where interagency cooperation is as 
close to the ideal as possible in Southeast Asia is in the Philippines. If legislation existed, 
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similar in spirit to legislation that required the military to work jointly, the government 
could begin to “walk the walk” of true interagency cooperation throughout the world. 
Legislation could be drafted that gives agencies the tools to work together when it makes 
sense.  The legislation would not be binding, but simply provide mechanisms to enable 
people to utilize funds and resources across agencies and in situations where common 
foreign policy objectives exist.  DoD, DoS, USAID and other agencies in the field and at 
headquarters would be able to consider challenges that each face when attempting to 
collaborate on any given issues.   
I. MILITARY COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
The reality of any foreign policy goal is that it simply cannot be carried out by 
one U.S. agency; it is therefore evident that the military alone is insufficient to rebuild a 
State’s rule of law, economy, and provide security. Such efforts require a number of 
agencies’ expertise: the military to secure the area, USAID to implement development 
programs and the Department of State to facilitate diplomatic agreements with host 
governments. Fortunately, these relationships have gotten better over the years with 
lessons learned from successes in the Philippines.  Due to access and placement, use of 
this collaborative model has increased recently with Military Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) working closely with other U.S.G. agencies in the field. However, SOF operations 
are sensitive and knowledge about these programs is limited. Most programs are 
classified which restricts who had access to read cables.  
The gravity of the situation and the dire need for the military to do more than just 
talk is best summed up in an article by Douglas Samuelson, “Winning More with Less.”  
Samuelson said “The DoD situation has three relatively new aspects: first, the weak 
economy which makes it more important to set priorities among competing goals; 







many more numerous and complex interactions among capabilities in order to assess 
what the country can accomplish; and third, the increasing number and importance of 
missions outside the military’s traditional combat role.”63 
The military recognized the importance of cooperation and “USSOCOM created 
the Interagency Task Force (IATF) to use Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) to 
coordinate with the interagency. The mission of the IATF is to serve as a coordinating 
activity within DoD and across the interagency. One of their primary goals is to be a 
reliable and connected entity that is able to integrate IA efforts while solving discrete 
problem sets that support the war on terror. 64 They have established an Interagency 
Partnership Program that currently places 40 USSOCOM staff officers into billets at 13 
agencies and departments. This is just a small step but has shown to work. These officers 
provide critical situational awareness and connectivity between USSOCOM and their 
host organizations with the SOST main forces is counterterrorism”.65  
IATF’s 18 contributing organizations provide strategic guidance. In theory, these 
agencies should have equal say, but unfortunately due to recent success on counter 
terrorism (CT) programs, the IATF has focused on that singular goal.  “The Special 
Forces community points to the successes in Afghanistan and argues that IATF should 
operate as task forces in the covert world at the tactical level.”66   
In the Philippines, U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines 
(JSOTF-P) and other U.S. agencies are helping the Philippine government battle an 
insurgency. Together they have done an excellent job of providing peace, security, and  
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development assistance. Operations in the Southern Philippines are a model for how SOF 
can and should work and how to effectively counter terrorist organizations and 
interagency cooperation.  
JSOTF-P is a small elite force that is comprised of approximately 500–600 
personnel including Army Special Operations Forces, Navy Seals and Air Force special 
operators who act independently of the conventional military.  67 In the Philippines, SOF 
liaised with Embassy officials and AFP General Headquarters to integrate cooperation 
without involving the red tape of the big Army. Specific examples of JSOTF-P 
coordination include:  
 Veterinary Civic Action Programs to provide farmers livelihood 
assistance.  
 Engineering Civic Action Programs to provide local communities 
infrastructure improvements such as schools, water wells, roads, piers and 
medical centers.  
 Sharing intelligence data and other information to assist the AFP in 
planning future operations.  
 Building AFP capacity through subject matter expert exchange programs 
to exchange lessons learned on subjects such as: Civil Military Operations 
Planning, Maritime Operations, and Casualty Evacuation.68   
These efforts have been applauded by other agencies with whom SOF worked. 
One USAID official said, “Close inter-agency cooperation gives all U.S. government 
stakeholders an opportunity to discuss ongoing aspects of programs to ensure that all 
participating agencies have a clear understanding of overall objectives and the 
operational aspects of projects.” 69 An Embassy official stated, “This well-established  
 
                                                 
67 Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines, Web page JSOTF-P Fact Sheet http://jsotf-
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civilian-military cooperation has enhanced the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance, 
spread the benefits of assistance more widely, and fostered goodwill towards America 
among the Philippine people.”70 
The USAID program was just one agency that worked on the joint task force, but 
they were the driving force in scheduling medical, dental and veterinary exercises. They 
also worked with the military to deploy to nearby islands to build schools and medical 
clinics. In this scenario, USAID acted as a bridge between the military and 
nongovernmental organizations that did not want to work directly with the military. SOF 
provided access and placement that enabled development workers to know where to work 
and identify projects that were priorities for the community.   “In the Philippines, the 
United States takes a holistic approach to fostering peace and security, an approach which 
combines the efforts of USAID, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and 
the Department of Justice. There are numerous mechanisms for exchanging information 
between these and other agencies, with the overall aim of providing guidance and 
recommendations to the U.S. Country Team, the U.S. Government’s primary policy-
making body in the Philippines.”  This quote is only partially correct.  The success of the 
program was due to SOF not larger DoD efforts. 
J. INTERAGENCY CHALLENGES   
DoD and other USG agencies have their own cultures, standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and rules.   With no interagency schools and limited training 
opportunities before working together in the field, one can easily see how problems arise. 
Once in the field, agencies are often under stringent deadlines to meet foreign policy 
goals and undergo extreme scrutiny from Congress and the Administration.  Moreover, 
the situation is complicated by different authorities, types of money, organizational goals 
for which each agency must adhere. While there are many challenges, as previously 
mentioned, that impede cooperation, there are a few key challenges that, if addressed, 
would substantially improve the flow of communication. 
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K. DISCREPANCIES IN CLEARANCES 
DoD and State must establish standards of information sharing at the appropriate 
classification level. Previously noted, was the fact that military efforts are often not 
known because of this issue. As it stands now, exchanging information is problematic 
because each agency has different types of clearances.  This makes it impossible to freely 
share information with counterparts as one is unsure if the person whom they are briefing 
has the appropriate clearance.  The current practice of different agencies having 
individual security clearances procedures should be replaced by one in which a single 
agency is responsible for establishing, providing, and maintaining all clearances within 
the federal government. 
L. INABILITY TO SHARE RESOURCES 
Some agencies have money, others do not.  Of the agencies that have money, 
Congress has attached specific instructions on how money can be used, what it can be 
used for and when it can be spent. Within an agency, it is complicated enough to figure 
out under what circumstances monies can be used and for what programs. The situation 
quickly becomes much more obscure, when one tries to figure out how one agency could 
utilize money that is from another agency. 
M. PREVIOUSLY INTRODUCED LEGISLATION 
The Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) is the 
most notable piece of legislation that has impacted coordination, and is a successful 
model which could be instructive for future legislation.  In 2009, (H.R. 2207) titled, “The 
Interagency Cooperation Commission Act” was introduced.  Even though it could help 
reduce the cost of doing business overseas while promoting a more streamlined model for 
cooperation, the bill died in committee. For this, discussion is important to consider both 
pieces of legislation, since they would be useful documents in which to refer as one 
moves forward.  
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N. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
REORGANIZATION ACT  
In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act (GNA). This act was sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and 
Congressman Bill Nichols and brought about sweeping changes in Department of 
Defense.  Specifically, these changes “centralized operational authority through the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs; designated the chairman as 
the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council and secretary of 
defense; established the position of vice-chairman and streamlined the operational chain 
of command from the president to the secretary of defense to the unified commanders.71  
In essence, the Act elevated the military’s advisory capacity within the Administration 
and mandated joint operations among all branches of the military. Additional legislation:  
Joint Vision 2010 passed in 1996 and Joint Vision 2020 passed in 2000, further expanded 
joint operations.  They stated that “the most effective force must be fully joint: 
intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. The joint 
force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational 
success in the future.”72 
O. THE INTERAGENCY COOPERATION COMMISSION ACT 
“Congressman Randy Forbes (D-VA) introduced legislation (H.R. 2207) titled, 
“The Interagency Cooperation Commission Act” on April 30, 2009. The purpose of this 
commission is “…to examine the long-term global challenges facing the United States 
and develop legislative and administrative proposals to improve interagency 
cooperation.”73  This legislation died in committee in the 111th Congress. 
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With a rising deficit, agencies being asked to do more with less, and a weary 
military, the timing is right for legislation which facilitates cooperation on the ground.  
While practitioners from all agencies contend that coordination is occurring at the highest 
levels, beyond meetings, “looping in” other agencies and seeking clearances on classified 
documents, one can argue that it is not.  The types of coordination that are needed in the 
field are agencies jointly: writing assessments that inform the types of programs to 
implement; co-implementing programs; sharing funding spigots and being held 
responsible for a programs successes and failures as a co-managed program rather than 
by agency. Simply put, the current framework for all agencies merely enables them to get 
the mission done in the most effective means. 
Efforts in Philippines offer glimpses of what successful joint activities could look 
like. While these engagements may have a few glitches, it is clear that with a directive to 
coordinate these models could expanded and retooled to ensure the United States is able 
to be more effective use taxpayers’ dollars while ensuring that intended beneficiaries reap 
the greatest benefits. Admiral Mullen may have said it best, “The days where a single 
service, a single department, a single anything can make things happen are behind us, it’s 
got to be integrated, and it’s got to be all of us doing this together.” 
The trend that the United States will just outspend China is cause for concern.  
The optics of providing assistance is honorable, while the optics of use of military force 
is not.  However, in an influence framework, both strategies produce the same results: to 
advance a country’s interest and deter the opposition from expanding. The problem with 
this is that it leads to all forms of assistance support being left unchecked.  In other 
words, as long as assistance is given, recipient’s countries gladly collect their checks 
without considering what is being asked of them.  This leaves the door open for countries 
such as China (and the United States) to provide assistance for the sole purpose of 
political gain. In addition, it promotes countries providing support to the highest bidder.  
“In Palau, the Compact of Free Association has worked well for the last 15 years; 
however, this agreement was recently renegotiated.  The agreement was slated to end in 
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2009, which meant the end of a $15 million a year commitment by the United States.”74  
The Government of Palau (GoP) was stringently opposed to this. In numerous articles 
during the negotiation, the GoP said that the United States has not adhered to promises 
and cautioned that they will be forced to look for other friends for support. This is a 
thinly veiled threat to the United States that Palau will look to China for friendship and 
financial support.   
Influence is a high-stakes game that super powers must play. The United States 
and China are both major players and small countries act in supporting roles. Still small 
countries are able to impact strategies at the highest levels. They are able to leverage 
more assistance and change their allegiances, both of which greatly impact the overall 
game. Given the cost and importance of influence, it is useful to develop a model to 
quantify: what the “buyer” is getting and what is lost—or gained—if assistance is not 
provided.  Game theory gives us a model to analyze these questions and make informed 
decisions. 
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VII. GAME THEORY 
A. GAME THEORY 
“Game Theory” is a tool to demonstrate possible outcomes between the United 
States and China in the influence and assistance realm.  It is loosely based on the United 
States–U.S.S.R. game theory during the Cold War.  The following game model identifies 
assumptions, an outline of possible outcomes, identifies options without communication, 
strategic moves, first move options, threats, promises, prudential security, interval 
scaling, and combinations of tactics, and recommendations. 
1. Assumptions 
 Less assistance does not lead to less influence if both the United States 
and China give less assistance.  
 If one country gives more assistance, it will gain more influence.   
 The more assistance the United States gives to another country, the more 
money it has to borrow and the less money it will have for domestic 
programs. 
 The more assistance the United States gives; the more debt it will incur.  
 The more debt the United States incurs, the more it has to borrow from 
China. 
 Both the United States and China are rational. 
 Both the United States and China are attempting to maximize their 
outcomes. 
B. OUTLINE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES. 
It is important to understand the set-up of the game, in order to determine cause 
and affect relationships among options. Below is Matrix 1, which highlights the various 
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For Matrix 1, the four possible outcomes are as follows: 
 
 AC – The United States gives less assistance and maintains level of 
influence. China gives less assistance and level of influence stays the 
same. 
 AD - The United States gives less assistance and level of influence 
decreases. China gives more assistance and gains influence. 
 BC – The United States gives more assistance and gains influence. China 
gives less assistance and level of influence decrease. 
 BD – To keep pace with China, the United States gives more assistance 
thereby failing deeper into debt while not increasing the level of influence. 
China increases assistance to gain influence and to make the United States 
spend more money. 
C. OPTIONS 
Parameters must be established to understand how the game is played. The 
following options available to the United States and China are listed in rank order.  




D. U.S. OPTIONS 
4 – Best – Both the United States and China lower assistance without either losing 
any influence. 
3 – Next Best – The United States gives more assistance and China gives less. 
Under this scenario, the United States is able to buy more influence than China. 
The cost of influence will result in greater debt for the United States, but decision 
makers agree it is worth it.  
2 – Least – The United States gives less assistance and China gives more. In this 
case, the United States will lose the influence race to China.  The United States 
does not spend as much money overseas and the world looks to China as the 
world leader.  
1 – Worst – The United States gives more assistance in order to keep up with 
China. By both United States and China giving more assistance, neither one 
surpasses the other. The United States goes deeper in debt and has to borrow more 
money from China.     
E. CHINA’S OPTIONS 
4 – Best – China and United States both give more assistance. Neither country 
gains influence. However, this option is detrimental for the United States because 
the United States will have to borrow more money and fall deeper in debt to keep 
up with China. Furthermore, at any time, China could turn off the cash flow to the 
United States 
3 – Next best – China gives more assistance and gains more influence.   
2 – Least best – China gives less assistance and loses influence. The world sees 
China lacking influence. China is helping the United States gain influence by 
loaning the U.S. money. 
1 – Worst – Both China and the United States give less assistance neither increase 
their influence. The United States benefits in that it is able to spend more money 
at home and borrow less from China.  
F. MATRIX 2 
Matrix 2 shows options between the United States and China using numeric 
values. The United States arrows are in blue with China in red. The arrows illustrates the 
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G. STRATEGIC MOVES 
The United States and China both have a dominant strategy that is not based on 
either’s decision.  
 
 No matter what the United States chooses, China will continue to give 
more assistance to gain more influence than the United States and to be 
seen as a world power. 
 The United States has to give less assistance due to their rising debt and 
the need to spend the money on domestic programs.  
 As a result of an expected payoff, it is determined that a Nash Equilibrium 
exists at (2, 3).  




In summary, in this dominant strategy, the United States gives less assistance and 
China gives more. The outcome would result in the United States losing the world 
influence race to China, the world looking to China as the world leader not withstanding 
any of these pre-emptive moves or outcomes. In any event, the USG must have open 
communication with China in order to determine whether the United States has a first 
move, threat, promise, or a combination. 
H. FIRST MOVE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
United States first move: 
 If the United States does A, then China does D, implies (2, 3).  
 If the United States does B, then China does D, implies (1, 4). 
 The United States would chose outcome (2, 3) same as without 
Communication 
China first move: 
 If China does C, then United States does A, implies (4, 1). 
 If China does D, then United States does A, implies (2, 3). 
 China would choose (2, 3), the better option from their perspective.  
Both The United States and China would want the other to go first. If the United 
States to go first China could do no worse than a (2, 3) but could get (1, 4). If China’s to 
go first The United States could do no worse than a (2, 3) but could get (4, 1). 
I. THREAT 
United States issuance of a threat: 
 The United States wants China to do C which is to gives less assistance.  
 The United States wants China to “play” C. If China does D and the 
United States does the opposite of what it is logical and chooses option B 
the outcome would hurt United States interests. With an outcome of (1,4) 




The United States does not have a threat. (It should be noted the China also does 
not have a threat) 
J. PROMISE 
The United States wants China to do C. If China does C and the United States 
hurts itself, by choosing B, the outcome would be (3, 2). In the scenario, China benefits 
by increasing its statist from a “1” to a “2,” the United States decreases it status from a 
“4” to a “3”; and the a promise eliminates (4, 1). While this appears to benefit the United 
States, it does not. China can still increase his utility with D, and the United States cannot 
get China to Choose C with a promise. It should also be noted the China is in the same 
situation as the United States with their promise. 
Just like the height of the arms race during Cold War with the U.S.S.R, the United 
States has limited on options. Without the time to wait for a first move, the United States 
needs to analyze threat and promises on both sides of prudential security to determine the 
most advantageous course of action. 
K. PRUDENTIAL SECURITY 
The next important step to understanding the problem is to analyze each player’s 
security level. In this game, the objective is for the player whose game is being analyzed 
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More Assistance     2                   4 
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Matrix 3 shows the results of China as a singular player. China is attempting to 
maximize their outcome. The United States is attempting to minimize China’s outcome. 




Less Assistance  More Assistance 
                                                                                     
Less Assistance            4                          2                    
                                                                                      
More Assistance               3               1 
 
Matrix 4 shows the results of United States as a singular player. United States 
attempting to maximize their outcome: while China is attempting to minimize the U.S. 
outcome. The prudential strategy is A and the value of the game for United States is 2. 
When China and the United States play individually, the security for the United States 
and China are (2, 3). Matrix 5 will illustrate these two security levels and highlight that, 
when graphed; the result is a zero sum game. 
L. PRUDENTIAL STRATEGIES 
Prudential strategy is another way to shows that the United States should always 
play A and China should plays D for an outcome of (2, 3) With this outcome, the United 
States must revisit how to use assistance for influence. This is not acceptable if the 
United States wants to maintain being the world leader. 
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M. INTERVAL SCALING 
An interval scale allows weighted preference of options available to the United 
States and China. The next two matrixes will illustrate the cardinal utilities. The numbers 
will reflect the individual preferences of the United States and China. 
 
Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the United States 
 
10 - Both United States and China lower assistance without losing any influence. 
 
 
7 – The United States gives more assistance and China gives less. Under this 
scenario, the United States is able to buy more influence than China. The cost of 
influence will result in greater debt for the United States, but policymakers agree 
it is worth it.  
 
5 – The United States gives less assistance and China gives more. In this scenario, 
the United States is losing the world influence race to China.  The United States 
may not be spending as much money overseas but the world is looking to China 
as the world leader.  
 
1 – The United States has to give more assistance to keep up with China. By both 
the United States and China giving more assistance neither one gains on the other. 
The United States goes deeper in debt and has to borrow more money from China.    
 
  1            2              3             4               5             6             7              8               9             10 




Interval Scaling of Cardinal Utilities for the China 
 
10 – China and United States both have to give more assistance. China will not 
gain more influence than the United States in the short run, however in the long 
run the United States will have to borrow more money to keep pace and will fall 
deeper in debt. At any time the China can turn off the cash flow to the United 
States 
8 – China gives more assistance and gains influence. The United States gives less 
and is looked weaker in the eyes of the world.   
3 – China gives less assistance and loses influence. The world sees China as a 
back seat player. China helps the United States gain influence by loaning them the 
money. 
1 – Both China and the United States give less assistance. China does not gain 
influence on the United States The United States is able to spend more money 
domestically and borrows less from China. 





                                                              
 
1             2             3            4           5             6            7             8            9              10 







Less Assistance     More Assistance 
 
Less Assistance                10 1               5 8                     U.S. 
                                                
More Assistance                7 3              1 10 
 
The outcome with cardinal utilities is consistent with the original game. China 
will continue to give assistance to expand their influence, and the United States will be 
forced to lower the amount they give, so that they do not go deeper into debt and so 
money can be spent domestically. The United States cannot keep spending money if 
China keeps pace. In that case, the United States will go deeper into debt and throw good 





The PRC and the United States are in a zero sum game to see who will wield the 
most influences in Southeast Asia. The national deficit is over $14 trillion, and has 
reached a point where it jeopardizes national security. Many analysts contend that 
China’s growing influence may come at the expense of U.S. power and influence in the 
region.75 The complexities of China’s growing influence are multifaceted, and, the United 
States cannot ignore that it could lose ground in key regions throughout the world. One 
example of this is the PRC’s aid in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos.  China focuses on the 
poorest countries in Southeast Asia and ones that have had relatively unfriendly relations 
with the United States. China is considered the primary supplier of economic and military 
assistance to these countries and provides an implicit security guarantee.76    Provocative 
PRC actions coupled with a bleak United States economy, force the U.S to look at 
different ways in which it could achieve its strategic objectives. The stakes are high and a 
wrong move could adversely affect years of productive diplomacy and waste millions of 
dollars of foreign assistance. 
The President, Congress and recently-established debt commission made 
recommendations on how to decrease the deficit.  Ideas range from a 5% cut across all 
government agencies to cutting DoD’s appropriation by $100 million dollars to getting 
rid of agencies all together. While these ideas – and many more – will be debated, it will 
take time for legislation to change how the USG appropriates money.  In any event, the 
point that is evident is that all agencies should be prepared to deal with likely cuts.  To 
contend with smaller budgets, the military, DoS, DoD, and USAID must determine how 
to utilize dwindling resources more effectively without undermining U.S. interests 
overseas. Never before has this task been such a difficult endeavor. 
                                                 
75 CRS Report for Congress, China’s “soft Power” in Southeast Asia, January 4, 2008, 1. 
76 Catherin E. Dalpino, “Consequences of a Growing China,” Statement before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 7, 2007. 
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Military budgets cut have to be effective, forward thinking and rational to ensure 
that the wrong message isn’t being sent to the PRC and Southeast. The United States 
must overhaul how interagency cooperation is been used. Duplicate programs, red tape 
and lack of awareness are causing the United States to waste time, money and manpower. 
The United States must work with allies in and out of the region to leverage common 
security strategy. China is not going away and will only continue to persuade countries to 
adopt their objects. 
It therefore is imperative for the Administration, Congress and the DoD to work 
together to determine the way forward. With the right type of assistance interventions, 
not simply spending dollar for dollar, the United States can reverse this image problem 
and do so while taking into account shrinking appropriations.  Furthermore, as outlined in 
“the game” section of this Thesis, the rub is that if the United States continues on its 
current trajectory, the United States will fall further into debt from money that was 
borrowed from China while treading water and not advancing U.S. policy objective in the 
influence game.   
The PRC has assembled a comprehensive, complex, multi-faceted approach to 
building its prestige in Southeast Asia.  Such an all-encompassing strategy can only be 
countered by an equally well-thought out response. It is no longer relevant, nor advisable 
for the United States to simply check the PRC at each turn.  The PRC’s strategy looks 50 
years ahead and for the United States to keep pace, U.S. policies too must have an eye 
toward the future.  
The United States is at a cross roads, and decision makers at the highest levels 
must decide which path to take. The longer the decision is prolonged, the more difficult it 
will be to win over countries which have negative views of the United States and it will 
come at a greater financial cost, which we cannot afford. I believe the “next” Cold War 
will be between the United States and China and that influence will be fought with 
foreign assistance rather than nuclear weapons.  Unlike the “first” Cold War with Soviet 
Union, where the United States sought to outspend the Russians in the nuclear arms race, 
this Cold War will be a race to outspend the Chinese on a supermall in a small obscure 
country in Southeast Asia. 
53 
 
APPENDIX. BATTLE FOR THE PARACELS ISLANDS   
A. GAME THEORY 
“Game Theory” is a tool to demonstrate possible outcomes between Vietnam and 
China for the control of the Paracals Island.  The following game model identifies 
assumptions, an outline of possible outcomes, identifies options without communication, 
strategic moves, first move options, threats, promises.  
1. Assumptions 
 Paracals Island has massive oil and natural gas resources 
 China needs resources more than Vietnam to fuel its economy 
 Mekong River will be a factor due to China able to control water flow and 
Vietnam’s dependence. 
 Both counties see themself as the rightful owner of the Islands. 
 ASEAN will not get involved due to only China and Vietnam claim the 
Paracals Islands. Unlike the Spratly Island where five counties have 
claims. 
 ASEAN will condemn the action by the aggressor State but will not 
provide aid or military support.   
 The United States will not engage with military action.  
 China and Vietnam could go to war over the Paracals Island due to the fact 
China and Vietnam have history of going to war against each other. Also, 
the resources that are at stake make it more likely.  
 If both sides go to war, China will not invade main land Vietnam. They 
will be fighting for what they see is rightly theirs, the Paracels Islands. 
Also, Vietnam is less likely to continue to fight if they lose the Islands if 
main land Vietnam is not invaded.   
 If a Vietnam or China tries to take by force, war is likely to occur.  
 If China or Vietnam drills for oil or natural gas, it is the same as take by 
force. 
 If both counties do nothing, the issues will remain the same and fall under 
concede control.      
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B. OUTLINE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
It is important to understand the set-up of the game, in order to determine cause 
and affect relationships among options. Below is Matrix 1, which highlights the various 
outcomes of options. 
   
Matrix 1 
China 
Take by force   Concede Control 
C            D 




Concede control B             B C             B D   
 
*Take by force is that the country is willing to go to war.* 
*Take by force is also drilling for oil or natural gas* 
*If no actions are taken, the issue will remain the same and fall under Concede Control* 
For Matrix 1, the four possible outcomes are as follows: 
 
 AC – Vietnam is willing to go to war to take control or if China tries to 
take control of the Paracels Island. China is will to go to war to take 
control or if Vietnam tries to take control of the Paracels Island. 
 AD – Vietnam will occupy by force and willing go to war for the Paracels 
Island.  China is willing to concede control to Vietnam. 
 BC – Vietnam is willing to concede control to China. China will occupy 
by force. 
 BD – Vietnam or China will take no further actions and will leave the 




Parameters must be established to understand how the game is played. The 
following options available to the Vietnam and China are listed below in rank order.  
Options available to the United States and China are ranked from best to worst (4 to 1). 
1. Vietnam’s Options 
4 – Best – Vietnam takes control of the Paracels Island without China’s 
involvement. 
3 – Next Best – Vietnam and China leave the situation as is. 
2 – Least – Vietnam and China go to war over the Paracels Island. By going to 
War Vietnam has a chance to gain control of the Paracels Islands. 
1 – Worst – Vietnam concedes control of the Paracels Islands to China and is 
unable to receive any resources. Also looks weak to China and unable to protect 
other interests (Mekong River and disputed land in the North) 
2. China’s Options 
4 – Best – China takes control of the Paracels Island without Vietnam 
involvement. China will have the resources to feed its economy with less outside 
support.  
3 – Next best – China goes to war for the Paracels Island with it being likely of 
winning due a more powerful Navy and Air Forces.   
2 – Least best – The situation stays the same and China has to spend more money 
on oil and gas. China and the world will one day need these resources. The faster 
China gains control the fast their influence and power will grow.    
1 – Worst – Vietnam takes control of the Paracels Island and China concedes 
control, looking weak on the world stage and spending more money for oil and 
gas. 
D. MATRIX 2 
Matrix 2 shows options between the Vietnam and China using numeric values. 
The Vietnam arrows are in blue with China in red. The arrows illustrates the direction 




          
Take by forces               Concede Control 
C                                        D 
 
Take by Forces A     2 3        4 1 
Vietnam                                                                       
 
Concede Control B          1 4                       3 2 
 
E. STRATEGIC MOVES 
Vietnam and China both have a dominant strategy that is not based on either’s 
decision.  
 
 No matter what Vietnam chooses, China will continue to give to try to 
gain control of the needed resources of the Paracels Island and to see as a 
world power. 
 Vietnam would like for China to concede control or maintain status quo, 
but that is unlikely.  China’s best to options is to take by forces.    
 As a result of an expected payoff, it is determined that a Nash Equilibrium 
exists at (2,3).  
 The likely outcome without communication would be (2,3).  
In summary, in this dominant strategy, the game matrix shows both China and 
Vietnam using force. This also shows China is more likely to use force than Vietnam.  
The outcome would result in China willing to use forces/to go to war and Vietnam not 
conceding control notwithstanding, any of these pre-emptive moves or outcomes. In any 
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event, the Vietnam must have open communication with China in order to determine 
whether Vietnam has a first move, threat, promise, or a combination. 
1. First Move for the Vietnam and China 
Vietnam first move: 
 If the Vietnam does A, then China does C, implies (2, 3).  
 If the Vietnam does B, then China does C, implies (1, 4). 
 The Vietnam would chose outcome (2,3 ) same as without 
Communication 
China first move: 
 If China does C, then Vietnam does A, implies (2, 3). 
 If China does D, then Vietnam does A, implies (4, 1). 
 China would choose (2, 3), the better option from their perspective.  
Both Vietnam and China would want the other to go first. If Vietnam were to go 
first, China could do no worse than a (2, 3) but could get (1, 4). If China went first, 
Vietnam could do no worse than a (2, 3) but could get (4, 1). 
2. Threat 
Vietnam issuance of a threat: 
 Vietnam wants China to do D which is to concede control.  
 Vietnam wants China to “play” D. If China does C and the United States 
does the opposite of what it is logical and chooses option B the outcome 
would hurt Vietnam interests. With an outcome of (1,4) China would 
benefits rather than be adversely affected.  





Vietnam wants China to do D. If China does D and the Vietnam help itself, by 
choosing B, the outcome would be (3, 2). In the scenario, China hurts itself by decreasing 
its statist from a “2” to a “1,” Vietnam decreases it status from a “4” to a “3”; and the a 
promise eliminates (4,1). While this appears to benefit Vietnam, it does not. China can 
still increase his utility with C, and the Vietnam cannot get China to Choose D with a 
promise. It should also be noted the China is in the same situation as Vietnam with their 
promise. 
Without the time to wait for a first move, Vietnam needs to analyze threat and 
promises on both sides of prudential security to determine the most advantageous course 
of action. 
4. Prudential Security 
The next important step to understanding the problem is to analyze each player’s 
security level. In this game, the objective is for the player whose game is being analyzed, 
to maximize its outcome. The results determine a security value for Vietnam and China. 




Take by Forces          Concede Control 
C                                              D 
Take by Forces A     3                          1  
            
                                         
Concede Control B       4                    2 
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Matrix 3 shows the results of China as a singular player. China is attempting to 
maximize their outcome. Vietnam is attempting to minimize China’s outcome. The 
prudential simultaneously strategy is C and the value of the game for China is 3. 
Matrix 4 
                                                             
Take by Forces       Concede Control 
                                              C                                         D 
Take by Forces A            2                          4                                         
Vietnam                                                                      
Concede Control B             1               3 
Matrix 4 shows the results of Vietnam as a singular player. Vietnam attempting to 
maximize their outcome, China is attempting to minimize the Vietnam outcome. The 
prudential strategy is A and the value of the game for Vietnam is 2. When China and 
Vietnam play individually, the security for Vietnam and China are (2, 3). Matrix 5 will 
illustrate these two security levels and highlight that, when graphed; the result is a zero 
sum game. 
5. Prudential Strategies 
Prudential strategy is another way to show that Vietnam should always play A 
and China should play C for an outcome of (2, 3). With this outcome, Vietnam must 
revisit how to stop China from taking the Paracels Islands.  
F. HOW THE WAR FOR THE PARACELS ISLAND COULD HAPPEN 
In the last 20 years, PRC has embarked on an aggressive campaign to find much-
needed resources to support the country's rapid growth.  Most recently, China identified 
the Paracels Island as having critical stores of oil and natural gas, which China could use 
to fuel its red hot economy.   However, in order for China to obtain resources, China has 
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had to become increasingly more political.  One example is China's determination to split 
up ASEAN by driving a wedge between Mainland and Maritime supporters.  The 
calculus for this maneuver was that ASEAN would not economically or militarily support 
Vietnam, or any other country that has policies counter to the PRC. Another tactic China 
has employed is to exert its will regardless of world opinion.  In the past, China dammed 
the Mekong River, but later released the water. Now it is expected that China will dam 
the Mekong in order to control the flow of water to Thailand, Cambodia and Laos and 
provide aid to offset the damming.  China will state that they needed to dam the river due 
to their needs and interests and that they rightfully control the upper Mekong.  Since the 
Mekong River is the life blood for Vietnam, it will be forced to take action and go to 
ASEAN to ask for help.  However, given China’s influence in ASEAN, ASEAN would 
condemn the action but state that this issue is between China and Vietnam. With no 
alternatives, Vietnam would try to destroy the dams on the upper Mekong River which 
would cause China to take control of the Paracels Island. China would justify the action 
base on security and state that they are the rightful owner of the Paracels Islands. China 
would keep all actions to the Sea of China and with a more powerful Navy and Air 
Forces, take control of the Islands.      
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